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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over final judgments of the district courts pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008). However, as discussed more fully 
below, because a notice of appeal was not timely filed in this case, the Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Does this Court have jurisdiction to decide this appeal when a notice of 
appeal was not timely filed? 
Standard of Review: Not applicable. This is an issue to be decided by this Court 
in the first instance. 
II. Did the district court err in dismissing the plaintiffs amended complaint? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the district court's rulings on a motion to 
dismiss a complaint for correctness. Busche v. Salt Lake County, 2001 UT App 111, ^ 6; 
26 P.3d 862. 
III. Did the district court err in dismissing granting summary judgment on the 
defendants' counterclaim for unlawful detainer? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a district court's decision to grant 
summary judgment for correctness. Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 
T| 19; 621 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. 
IV. Did the district court err in determining the reasonable amount of attorney 
fees incurred by the prevailing party? 
Standard of Review: A district court's decision regarding what constitutes a 
1 
reasonable attorney fee is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Jensen v. 
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, If 127; 130 P.3d 325. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
I. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-811(4) (2008) provides: 
(a) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer, execution upon the judgment 
shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. 
(b) In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately. 
n. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802(l) (2008) provides: 
A tenant holding real property for a term less than life, is guilty of unlawful 
detainer if the tenant: 
(a) continues in possession . . . after the expiration of the specified 
term or period for which it is let to him. 
III. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2007) provides: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding 
one year,... shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This action arises from a landlord-tenant dispute between the appellant, David 
Truong ("Truong"), and the appellees, Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes (the 
"Holmeses"). 
In September 2004, Truong sued the Holmeses. R. 1. Truong's complaint 
contained three claims for relief: promissory estoppel, specific performance, and unjust 
enrichment. R. 4, 6. On June 29, 2005, the district court dismissed the first and second 
claims for relief, holding that the written lease in this case was unambiguous and that, as 
a matter of law, the first two claims for relief failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. R. 167. The district court granted Truong leave to amend the third 
cause of action. R. 171. 
Thereafter, Truong filed an amended complaint. R. 173. The amended complaint 
contained claims for fraud in the inducement, specific performance, and unjust 
enrichment. R. 176, 177. The Holmeses then filed a counterclaim against Truong 
alleging, among other things, that Truong had breached the lease and was guilty of 
unlawful detainer by remaining in the leased premises after the termination of the lease. 
R.201. 
On August 23, 2005, the Holmeses filed a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint. R. 197. In addition, on November 7, 2005, the Holmes filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment seeking money damages under their counterclaim. R. 501. 
On August 9, 2006, the district court signed an order dismissing Truong's 
amended complaint. R. 733. In that order the district court stated: "[T]his matter is final 
as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by the clerk of the Court." R. 749. 
At this point all that remained before the district court was the Holmeses5 
counterclaim. On November 15, 2006, the district court signed a partial summary 
judgment in favor of the Holmeses on their counterclaim. R. 1038. The judgment stated: 
"This judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by the Clerk of 
the Court without delay pursuant to Rule 54(b) and/or pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3 
36-10C4)."1 R. 1048. The judgment was entered on the registry of judgments on 
November 30, 2006. R. 1038. Among other things, the judgment found that Truong was 
guilty of unlawful detainer because he refused to vacate the leased premises upon 
termination of the lease. R. 1046. 
Later, on March 13, 2007, the district court awarded supplemental damages to the 
Holmeses. R. 1176. As it had done with the previous judgment, the district court stated: 
"This Judgment is final as to the matter ruled upon and shall be entered by the Clerk of 
the Court without delay pursuant to Rule 54(b) and/or Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4)." 
R. 1185. The judgment was entered in the registry of judgments on April 26,2007. 
R. 1176. 
Subsequently, the district court was called upon to assist with various efforts to 
collect the judgment. For example, on July 12, 2007, the district court issued a garnishee 
order. R. 1362. In addition, Truong filed a motion for partial judgment with respect to 
two claims in the Holmeses' counterclaim that Truong believed had not yet been 
resolved. On March 24, 2008, the district court entered an order entitled "Final Order," 
in which the district court found that the remaining claims in the counterclaim had been 
abandoned. R. 1449. The Court also denied the Holmeses5 motion seeking removal of a 
lis pendens that Truong had filed against their property. IdL Finally, the district court 
noted that "as of this Order, neither party has any claims remaining against the other." 
IdL 
Truong filed a notice of appeal on April 17, 2008. R. 1538. 
1
 This section, which has been renumbered as 78B-6-811, provides that in unlawful detainer actions judgments may 
be entered and enforced immediately. 
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Statement of Facts 
1. The Holmeses are the owners of real property located at 1050 South State 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Leased Premises"). R. 174. The Leased Premises are 
the subject of this appeal. 
2. Truong is an individual residing in Salt Lake County. R. 173. 
3. On or about September 25, 200& the parties entered into a written Lease 
Agreement (the "Lease"), pertaining the Leased Premises. R. 189-194. 
4. In connection with the Lease, the parties also entered into a written Option 
Agreement (the "Option" or the "Option Agreement"). R. 184-188. 
5. The Option Agreement sets forth the terms and conditions which Truong 
needed to comply with in order to exercise the option to purchase the Leased Premises. 
R. 184. 
6. In its order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Holmeses, 
the district court found that it was undisputed that "[w]hen the deadline for electing to 
[exercise] the Option arrived, Truong was in breach of the Lease by failing to pay the 
property taxes, failing to obtain a performance bond, and for making unauthorized 
changes to the Leased Premises. He was also in breach of the Lease for failure to 
purchase and maintain insurance on the Leased Premises even though he paid one 
reimbursement check to the Landlords." R. 1040. 
7. It was also undisputed that the deadline for making an election to purchase 
the Leased Premises under the Option expired on August 2, 2004, and no election to 
purchase the Leased Premises was made before that date. R. 1040. 
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8. On August 19, 2004, the Holmeses sent a letter informing Truong that he 
had not made a timely election to exercise the Option, which was to be made between 
July 27, 2004, and August 2, 2004, in order purchase the Leased Premises. R. 1040. 
9. On July 22, 2005, the Holmeses gave formal written notice to Truong that 
Truong had breached the Lease by failing to pay $60,000 in rent and demand was made 
upon Truong to pay the rent together with accrued interest in the amount of $4,684.93. 
R.1041. 
10. Despite the notice of default given to Truong under the Lease, Truong 
failed to pay the $60,000 rent owing to the Holmeses. Truong also failed to cure other 
defaults under the Lease including but not limited to the payment of property taxes owing 
to Salt Lake County. 
11. On August 9, 2005, the Landlords gave written notice to Truong to quit or 
pay rent in compliance with Utah law. Despite service of the notice to quit or pay rent, 
Truong still failed to pay the rent owing to the Landlords. He also failed to vacate the 
Leased Premises and failed to cure other defaults. R. 1042. 
12. Because Truong remained in possession of the Property after October 31, 
2005, the Holmeses sought a further judgment against Truong for rent damages of 
$35,000 for the seven-month period of November 2005 through May 2006 and for treble 
damages of $70,000 for that same period of time, which the district court granted on 
March 13, 2007. R. 1184. 
13. The district court also awarded the Holmeses attorney fees "incurred in the 
enforcement of [the March 13, 2007] Judgment." R. 1184. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal because Truong 
did not file a timely notice of appeal. The judgments entered in the registry of judgments 
on November 30, 2006, and April 26,2007, were both expressly certified by the district 
court as final judgments pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Nevertheless, Truong did not file a notice of appeal until April 17, 2008. More 
importantly, even if the judgments had not been certified as final, there is no question that 
the district court's "Final Order," which was entered on March 24, 2008, disposed of all 
the claims in the case. Indeed, the district court expressly noted that "as of this Order, 
neither party has any claims remaining against the other." R. 1449. Because this is an 
unlawful detainer action, a notice of appeal was required "within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Thus, the notice of 
appeal was due by April 3,2008. The notice of appeal was not filed until April 17, 2008. 
R. 1538. In the absence of a timely notice of appeal, this Court does not have jurisdiction 
to consider this appeal, and the Court should dismiss the appeal. 
In addition, even if this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, it should still 
affirm the decisions of the district court. First, the district court did not err in dismissing 
Truong's amended complaint. The fraudulent inducement claim fails as a matter of law 
because Truong could not reasonably rely on alleged oral agreements that were directly 
contradicted by the documents he signed. The specific performance claim fails because it 
is undisputed that Truong did not comply with the terms of the Option. The unjust 
enrichment claim fails because this claim is not available when the parties' agreements 
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and dealings are governed by a written contract. 
Second, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Holmeses on their counterclaim for unlawful detainer. It is undisputed that Truong 
remained in the Leased Premises after the termination of the lease in violation of Utah's 
unlawful detainer statute. 
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of 
attorney fees to which the Holmeses were entitled. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR TRUONG'S 
APPEAL, 
The judgments entered in the registry of judgments on November 30, 2006, and 
April 26, 2007, were both expressly certified by the district court as final judgments 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The judgments disposed of 
distinct claims, and, implicit in the district court's rulings is the conclusion that there was 
no just reason for delay. This is an unlawful detainer action, and by statute the district 
court's judgments could be entered and enforced immediately. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
811 (2008), formerly § 78-36-10(4). Indeed, the Holmeses did in fact take actions to 
immediately enforce their judgments against Truong. Nevertheless, Truong did not file a 
notice of appeal until April 17, 2008. This date is almost one year after the April 26, 
2007 judgment was entered. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court 
lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. 
More importantly, even if the judgments had not been certified as final, and even 
if the judgments were not final pursuant to § 78B-6-811, there is no question that the 
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district court's "Final Order," which was entered on March 24, 2008, disposed of all the 
claims in the case. Indeed, the district court expressly noted that "as of this Order, 
neither party has any claims remaining against the other." R. 1449. Because this is an 
unlawful detainer action, a notice of appeal was required "within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Thus, the notice of 
appeal was due by April 3, 2008. The notice of appeal was not filed until April 17, 2008. 
R. 1538. Therefore Truong did not file a timely notice of appeal, and this Court does not 
have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The Court should therefore dismiss it. 
II. IF TfflS COURT DETERMINES THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION TO 
CONSIDER THIS APPEAL, IT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DECISIONS OF 
THE DISTRICT COURT. 
If this Court decides that it has jurisdiction to hear Truong 5s appeal, it should 
affirm the decisions and rulings of the district court for the reasons set forth below. 
Truong makes three arguments on appeal. First, he asserts that the district court erred in 
dismissing his amended complaint. Brief of Appellant at 13-23. Second, he alleges that 
the district court erred in granting the Holmeses' motion for summary judgment on their 
counterclaim. Id at 23-30. Finally he argues that district court erred in awarding 
damages to the Holmeses. IdL at 30-36. As shown below, these arguments are incorrect, 
and the district court did not err. 
A. The District Court Did Not Err in Dismissing Truong's Amended 
Complaint, 
Truong's amended complaint contained claims for fraud in the inducement, 
specific performance, and unjust enrichment. R. 176, 177. The district court did not err 
in dismissing these claims as a matter of law. 
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1. Fraudulent Inducement. 
The first cause of action asserted in the amended complaint is for fraud in the 
inducement. R. 176. As an initial matter, the district court ruled that Truong did not 
have leave to include this cause of action in his amended complaint. The district court 
held: 
The Amended Complaint filed by Truong was not in compliance with the 
Court's order and Truong's unilateral actions in filing and Amended 
Complaint, which went beyond the scope of the amendment permitted by 
the Court, was improper. Truong did not seek or obtain leave of the Court 
to file amendments to his complaint which exceeded the boundaries 
permitted by the Court. 
R. 739. Truong does not challenge this ruling on appeal, and it is dispositive of his 
appeal with respect to the dismissal of his fraudulent inducement claim. 
Moreover, even if the fraudulent inducement claim had been properly before the 
district court, the district court did not err in dismissing it as a matter of law. To state a 
claim for fraud, a plaintiff must plead and establish, by clear and convincing evidence, as 
follows: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew 
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such a representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) 
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982) (quoting Pace v. 
Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 1952)). If any of the foregoing elements is not 
satisfied, then the claim must fail. Id Under this standard, the district court did not err in 
dismissing Truong's amended complaint for several reasons. 
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First, when Truong signed the written documents in this case, he expressly agreed 
that he did not rely on any other understanding between the parties. The Lease, which is 
attached to the amended complaint, states: "This instrument constitutes the final, fully 
integrated expression of the agreement between the LESSOR and the LESSEE." R. 193. 
In addition, the Option states: "This Agreement supersedes all prior agreements between 
the parties with regard to the subject matter hereof and there are no other understandings 
or agreements between them." R. 187 (emphasis added). The district court correctly 
ruled that "Truong could not reasonably rely on conflicting oral terms when he entered 
into the Lease agreeing that he did not rely upon prior understandings between the 
parties." R. 744. As the district court noted, "Truong does not allege that he was 
fraudulently induced to sign the wrong Lease but that he signed the Lease believing that a 
prior oral agreement was the controlling agreement between the parties." R. 744. As a 
matter of law, such reliance—even it in fact existed—is unreasonable. Therefore, the 
district court did not err in dismissing Truong's amended complaint as a matter of law.2 
In addition to the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court has stated on numerous 
occasions that a claim for fraud or deceit may not be predicated upon a person's failure to 
perform an oral promise which is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. In Ravarino 
v. Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953), the Court explained the doctrine stating: 
Nor, as a general rule, can fraud be predicated upon the failure to perform a 
promise or contract which is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, 
since in such case the promisor has not, in a legal sense, made a contract, 
and hence has the right, both in law and in equity, to refuse to perform. 
2
 The district court also correctly dismissed the fraudulent inducement claim on the grounds that Truong had not 
pleaded fraud with particularity as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). See R. 745 at % 48. 
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Ravarino, 260 P.2d at 578, Likewise, in Papanikolas v. Sampson, 1 I i1 S %IS «1 ' i ,'nli 
1929), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the JisnnssJ of u frond claim associated with the 
sale of real proper!) I used « \w statute of frauds. See also Easton v. Wycoff 295 P._J. 
332 11 '(."iii 1956); Wardley Corp. Better Homes & Gardens v. Burgess, 
(UtahApp. 1991). 
2. Specific [vrfuniokMn', 
The second cause of action in the amended complaint was for specific 
performance. This cause of action was included m Hit oncjncf Miiplaint and was 
properly dismissed by Ific i JIJJU t<>, \ mi! -c* a matter of law. 
'• " 1 Yiinng argues that because he gave notice of his intent to purchase the Leased 
Premises he is entitled to specific performance of the upin HI strict court 
appropriately rej ected this c. I; 111«•, 111 > ' i \ \A n d c <) * i rt stated in its written ruling: 
After considering the parties' respective arguments, the Court reiterates its 
initial ruling during the hearing that the terms of the Option Agreement are 
unambiguous. The Court also concludes that [Truong] failed to satisfy 
these terms because he did not provide written notice of his election to 
purchase the property until one month after the deadline for exercising the 
option. 
The analysis of this issue is simple. *. nong did not 
comply with tnt nts of the Option. He is therefore not entitled to 
specific perft - unco uf the Option. The district court did not err. 
3. Unjust Enrichment. 
The third cause of actinii in ilu immdrd complaint is for unjust enrichment. The 
di'Uni'l coin i < nooning with respect to the dismissal of this claim, is sound. 
First, the district court correctly ruled that "Utah law provides that a claim in 
unjust enrichment does not exist when there is an actual contract covering the subject 
matter." R. 746 (citing Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461,465 (Utah 
1978) ("Recovery in quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract 
covering the subject matter of the litigation."); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) ("Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no enforceable 
written or oral contract exists.")). In this case, the written Lease and Option are the 
controlling documents with respect to the parties' agreements and the economic 
advantages to which the parties were entitled. As a matter of law, those written 
agreements preclude Truong's claim for unjust enrichment. Truong responds by arguing 
that the written documents are unenforceable. Brief of Appellant at 22. However, this 
argument merely restates Truong's arguments for specific performance, all of which are 
precluded by the express terms of the written documents and by the statute of frauds. 
The district court did not err in dismissing the unjust enrichment claim as a matter 
of law, and this Court should affirm the district court's ruling. 
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment in 
Favor of the Holmeses on their Counterclaim for Unlawful Detainer. 
Truong's second argument on appeal is that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of the Holmeses on their counterclaim for unlawful detainer. 
As shown below, the district court did not err. 
First, the material facts were not in dispute. The district court correctly noted: 
"There are no material facts which have been duly controverted which would preclude 
the entry of partial summary judgment against Truong." R. 1043. In its detailed ruling, 
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district court dealt carefully and specifically with each o 1 11 i e 1 d11s i haI 1 rnou y a 11 e L» ed 
were disputed. R. 1043-11*4.. the dinner rnuri ilien li-iindthat each of these alleged 
disputes ^C;J . - r
 lSed on erroneous legal arguments, or (3) based on 
alleged oral agreements that were contrary to the unambiguous language n t (I M «> (I M t 
documents. It was undisputed in the distnci corn I and i( i einains undisputed before this 
Court—lhat I moiiy icniair»i »l m th>. ! .eased Premises after termination of the Lease in • 
^
 l
 unlawful detainer statute. Accordingly, the district court (I i d 11 i1 e i r 11i11 
its judgment should be affirmed. 
C. The District Court Did Not Err in Its Award of Damages to the 
Holmeses. 
Truong's final argument on appeal is that the district court a it\l m its iiwni < I i >t 
damages to the Holmeses. Truong argues ilmi tin" 1 lolnieses nre not entitled to treble 
damages, interest, - As shown below, these arguments are incorrect. 
First, I nmne's argument that the Landlords are not entitled to treble damages JS baseless. 
The Unlawful Detainer Act specifically pro1 ;, . _ . • an damages including 
lost rents arising after' tennniaf ioii of i he lease. Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(2). Here, 
loiiruil wnilni notice was served upon Truong in compliance with the Unlaw luJ Delainer 
Act and the Lease was terminated. Despite sueh in •( n t. 1i iiune refused to pay the rent 
owing to the LandJ« .i • Is »>i . • i * 11., • (.eased Premises. As a result, Truong is liable for 
treble damages as a matter of law, and the district court did not err.. 
Neither did the district court err in awat. ::;c . . t- .. * •• die Holmeses. 
As Tmong admits in his huef, interest was awarded with respect to "unpaid rents." Brief 
ol AppeJhiii i\\ 11 Interest was not awarded with respect to hold-over damages under the 
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unlawful detainer statute, and Truong's arguments on this point are simply misplaced. 
Truong's reliance on Smith v. Linman Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1223,1225 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) is misplaced. In Smith this Court stated the familiar rule that prejudgment 
interest is appropriate "when the loss is fixed at a particular time and the amount can be 
fixed with accuracy." Id. The Court noted that prejudgment interest in not appropriate 
when the claims are unliquidated as in cases of personal injury, wrongful death, or 
defamation because those damages are uncertain. In Smith the alleged damages to the 
crops were uncertain and therefore the Court denied prejudgment interest. But in this 
case, the unpaid rent amounts were fixed in time and amount and are easily ascertainable. 
A specific amount was due to the Holmes that could be (and was) calculated with 
mathematical accuracy. Therefore, prejudgment interest on the unpaid rent was 
appropriate, and the district court did not err. 
Finally, the district court did not err in awarding attorney fees to the Holmeses. 
Truong argues that there was insufficient evidence before the district court "to establish 
the reasonableness, recoverability or necessity of [the attorney] fees." Brief of Appellant 
at 34. 
In this case the district court found that "Truong does not heavily dispute the 
reasonableness of the fees other than to state the Holmes have not provided sufficient 
evidence to support them." R. 1025. However, the district court specifically noted that 
in their reply memorandum, the Holmeses had "attached invoices showing the time spent 
on each matter." R. 1027. The district court reviewed the invoices and found that they 
were generally reasonable. R. 1027. However, the court found some items in the 
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1028. 
In awarding fees, the district court noted the complexity of the case. It also noted 
that "Truong has added to the expense of the litigation by attempting at various times to 
'reargue matters that have already been litigated " R 1026 - ' 
The district court carefully reviewed the fees and made appropriate 
determinations. In so doing it did not abuse its discretion. This Court should not 
nvaliiiiTi tlu j di1-In in I in mill i ilm Urnmi i i t in i i Ikisni mi I U N I D P «,• < iiijuit; allf'tMiliuufi illli il I he re 
was "insufficient evidence" to support the award. 
CONCLUSION 
in this matter. The Court should also award the Holmeses their attorney fees in 
connection with this appeal. 
DA I EI n his J [ tl da) c >f Febi iiai ;; ,2009. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Steven W. Call 
Brent D. Wride 
Attorneys for the Holmeses 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE were mailed, postage prepaid, on this ofFebruary,2009,to: 
Shawn D. Turner 
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON, L.C. 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway # B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
UM^L 
1022176 
17 
